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The eminence of corporate governance (CG) was grasped after the major 
blunders in corporate strategies and distinct corporate scandals around the 
world during the global financial crises. Advanced countries have passed 
numerous laws such as ―Say on Pay‖ or the Sarbanes-Oxley Act to shield 
the shareholder’s wealth. However, the evolving countries are still 
flourishing to gain recognition in corporate governance (CG) 
effectiveness. The intention of the study is to probe the link between the 
CG (board size, outside directors) and firm performance (Tobin’s Q). 
Leverage has been used as interaction term in current study. The data had 
been collected from 130 non-financial firms from the year 2012 to 2015 
and Multiple Regression Techniques will be use as the instruments for 
data analysis. The results indicate that the board size and Tobin’s Q have a 
significant association and outside directors’ insignificant association with 
Tobin’s Q. The interaction effect of leverage found a significant 
connotation between board size, outside directors, and Tobin’s Q. 
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1. Introduction 
Performance of firms is dynamic significance for economic development of stakeholders and investors. Investors 
need a high return on their investment and well-organized business that could bring long-term profits for its 
stakeholders. Despite the extensive academic literature on the bases of firm performance, still researchers are 
struggling to evaluate the determinants of firm performance in both advanced and emerging economies (Cinca, 
Molinero, &Larraz, 2005; Delen, Kuzey, & Uyar, 2013; Galbreath & Galvin, 2008; Gombola & Ketz, 1983; 
Hawawini, Subramanian, &Verdin, 2003; Ho & Wu, 2006). As per as the current literature is concerned, 
researchers have evaluated several factors that could have an impact on the firm performances. For instance, 
pertaining the developed economies, there are certain factors such as employee ownership (Kim & Patel, 2017), 
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marketing capabilities (Cacciolatti & Lee, 2016), stakeholder relationships and brand equity (Wang & Sengupta, 
2016), these could positively or negatively influence a firm performance. On the other hand, developing countries 
are still focusing on issues such as the industry and governance diversity (Chen & Lin, 2016), capital structure 
(Iavorskyi, 2013), corporate governance (CG) (Arora & Sharma, 2016, khan & Ali, 2018), tangibles and intangibles 
(Lazăr, 2016) that could possibly influence a firm performance. In the specific context of Pakistan, previous studies 
identified that risk management, capital structure, CG and economic indicators could likely influence a firm 
performance of Pakistani capital market (Mirza & Javed 2013; khan & Ali, 2017). The business of Pakistan 
particularly industrial sectors is frequently facing low performance in a textile sector, cement, and shoe. This is 
leading to a feeble economy and poor firms’ performance which is eventually affecting the foreign investors to 
invest in Pakistan. Consequently, multinational corporations are unwilling to commence their corporate operations 
in Pakistan (Shaikh, 2013). Reports to CIA (2016), Pakistan industrial production growth in 2016 is 6.8%, still 
behind the production growth rate of 8.00% in 2007. Moreover, according to ICMAP (2015), the industrial sector 
of Pakistan is facing abounding issues like power and energy crises, lack of investment, high production cost, and 
weak governance cooperation. Due to all these factors, the industrial sectors are facing huge losses of about USD 
3.81 billion. This amount is almost 15% of the total revenues of government. 
 
As per above discussion which indicates the issues of the performance due to different factors like capital structure 
and CG etc. Nowadays, CG has attended more intention in the current business scenario all over the world 
particularly due to the corporate scams and the failures of firms all around the globe. Accountability and 
transparency became important for the investor's attraction and one hand capital funds and on the other hand, need 
financial security and stability. Recent business environment is very viable, the ambiguity and risk are the foremost 
features of the current business. The modern business environment becomes very tough to control and predict 
(Kuratko & Morris, 2003). Strong CG can be the best solution to lessen the risk and uncertainty in the current 
business scenarios. Moreover, decreasing the risk level can attract investors. It is usually supposed that good CG 
improves performance of the firm and provides protection to shareholders, interest. The most important role of a 
sound CG exercise will provide better link between the firms and its environment and shelter its important 
resources through appealing the capital funds and investors. Moreover, the sound CG exercise can be a real tool for 
the organization to attain better performance. In addition, sound corporate CG carries good management and better 
utilization of the firm resources which can significantly contribute to the firm value (Keong, 2002). Therefore, it is 
important to understand the link between CG and firm performance. Past studies found the inclusive results in the 
relationship between CG and firm performance. Most of earlier studies has been conducted related to CG in 
advanced countries but less attention was given to the emerging economies countries like Pakistan. This means that 
there is a need for such research. One of the vital confrontations in the corporate of sector of Pakistan is that of CG. 
Previous studies in Pakistan, however, revealed that Pakistan still has a weak CG structure (Ameer, 2013; Batool & 
Javid, 2014, Khan & Ali, 2017). The main aim of the current study is to test whether internal CG such as board 
size, outside directors influence the performance of Pakistani firm and also to check the interaction effect of 
leverage between them. 
 
 The following are the research objectives: 
a) To test the link between board size and firm performance in listed firms on Pakistan Stock Exchange year, 
2012 to 2015  
b) To test the link between outside directors and firm performance in listed firms on Pakistan Stock Exchange 
year, 2012 to 2015  
c) To test the interactional effect of leverage on the relationship between board attributes (board size and outside 
directors,) and firm performance in the listed firm Pakistan Stock Exchange year, 2012 to 2015. 
 
The concern of the current study is to emphasize the significance of leverage as possible description of interaction 
in strengthening or weakening the influence of CG on firm performance, particularly in the underdeveloped 
countries firms. 
 
2. Framework of the Study 
The research framework of the present study is a sprout of the Hsu (2013)., Khan, and Ali, (2017)., and Chen & 
Lin, (2016). is demonstrated in Figure 1. 
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Figure 1; Conceptual Frame Work 
Source; Shleifer and Vishny (1997); Hsu (2013)., Khan, and Ali, (2017)., Chen & Lin, (2016) 
 
3. Literature Review and Hypotheses Development of the Study  
Agency theory based upon the assumption that both agent and principal interest changes, and principal can reduce 
the gap of concern by offering maximum incentives to the agent also meet them to keep an eye on the agent (Ntim 
& Oseit, 2011; Khan & Ali 2017). A principal should take every measure to avoid agency issue (Bonazzi& Islam 
2007) and established the board of directors conflicting aspects of the management can aid to achieve the aim of 
superb governance and convincingly affect firm performance. 
 
Board activities are profoundly reliant on agency theory, as time passes, researches on the effects of CG and firm 
performance have been increased due to the realization of the importance of CG. Current literature is diverse and no 
consensus among the researchers concerning the outcome (Mayur & Saravanan, 2017; Black, Jang, & Kim (2006). 
Most of the prior studies reported that CG has an influence on firm performance for updated technology ventures 
and supported the relevant relationships among the CG. In addition, some of the previous studies reported the 
significant relationship CG and firm performance whose research was carried on the listed firm of Pakistan stock 
exchange (PSX) (Khan & Ali 2018; Akbar 2014). 
 
Moreover, board of directors two most imperative functions are monitoring and advising (Raheja 2005; Adams & 
Ferreira 2007) and performed by inside and outside directors, though Fama and Jensen (1983) indicates the value of 
outside directors, who bring valued expertise and possibly important contacts. The benefit of higher board size is 
the superior collective information that the board afterward possesses, and hereafter higher boards will lead to 
greater performance (Dalton & Co-workers 1999, 2005). 
 
Previous literature shown that the board size of the directors plays a vibrant role in the managements’ ability to 
oversee managers (Anderson, Mansi & Reeb 2004). According to Khan & Ali (2018), the link between the board 
size and performance is positive. Similarly, Coles, Daniel, & Naveen (2008) reported that performance gets better 
with board size for complicated companies. Some of the previous studies that reveal the negative link between the 
board size and performance include Mayur & Saravanan, (2017). Mashayekhi and Bazaz (2008) found an no link 
between board size and performance of Irani companies.  
 
On the other side, the position of outside directors is associated to their capability to evaluate the performance of 
the firm independently. The directors have valued knowledge about firms activates that works inside the firm, while 
outside directors can contribute objectivity and expertise in evaluating manager’s decisions. Therefore, large board 
independence permits non-executives directors to monitor a firm more strictly and take accurate actions. In addition 
to that, according to Brickley, and James (1987), the presence of outside directors contributes to reduction 
managerial consumption of perquisites. However, the results of the current academic literature on the empirical link 
Board attributes 
 Board size 
 
 Outside directors  
 
Firm Performance  
(Tobin’s Q) 
 Firm size 
  
 
 
 
 
 
Financial 
Leverage   
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between outside directors and firm performance are also mixed. For instance, Kouki and Guizani (2015), a study 42 
non-financial Tunisian firms over the period of 2004-2010 and they found a positive link between independent 
directors and firm performance. Mohapatra (2016) found that outside directors have an insignificant relationship 
with operating performance. Johl et al. (2015) also found an no link of board independence with firm performance 
in the Malaysian context. The current literature indicates the inconsistency or mixed results of board size and 
outside directors with performance. Therefore, firstly, the current study sees the effect of board size and outside 
directors on firm performance and secondly employee; the moderator was taken as leverage which was also been 
employed (Azeem, Hassan, & Kouser, 2013). 
 
H1: Board size have a significant influence on firm performance.  
H2: Outside directors have a significant influence on earnings firm performance  
H3: Leverage moderates the link between board size, outside directors and firm performance 
 
3.1 Control Variable  
Most of the previous studies used firm size as a control variable in estimating the link between the CG and firm 
performance. A study by Ehikioya (2009) found a positive association between firm size and firm performance. On 
the other side, Mohd Ghazali (2010) reported that firm size is negatively related to performance. 
 
4. Methodology of the Study  
4.1  Sample of the Study 
The total population of the current study incorporates the non-financial listed firm on the Pakistan stock exchange 
year, 2012 to 2015. A total of 130 firms serves as a sample out of 384 non-financial firms. The data of the variables 
collected through the annual reposts or state bank of Pakistan website. 
 
4.2 Measurement of the variables   
 
Table 1; Description of used variables  
 
Variables   Measurement  
Board size  ―Total number of directors on the board‖ 
Outside directors  ―The total number of outside non-executive directors/ total number of directors‖ 
Leverage  
Firm size  
―Total liabilities/ total assets‖ 
―Natural log of total assets‖  
Tobin’s Q ―Total asset + market value of equity – book value of equity – deferred taxes 
/Total assets‖ 
 
4.3 Model Specifications  
 
TobinQit  α β1 (BDSZit)  β2 (OSDZit) +β2(LEV*BDSit)+ β3(FS)+εit… 
 
4.4 Descriptive Analysis  
 
Table 2 
 
Variables  Mean  Std.dv Maximum  Minimum  
Board size 8.04 1.33 07 15 
Outside directors (%)  0.15 0.14 0 77 
Leverage  1.34 13.25 0.0008 298.27 
Tobins’ Q 0.57 1.23 0.003 22.07 
 
The above table 2 indicates the descriptive statistics which shows that the board size (BS) average value is 8.04, the 
minimum value is 07 and the maximum value is 15. Outside directors  
(OSD) average value is 0.15 and maximum 0 value and minimum value. The mean value of leverage is 1.34 and 
maximum value is 2.98 and minimum value is 0.0008. 
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4.5 Diagnostic tests 
4.5.1 Multicollinearity Testing 
The multilinearity test to displays Variance Inflation Factor (VIF) value of every independent variable as shown in  
Table 3 
 
Table 3 
 
The results indicate that every independent variable have a tolerance value is less 0.10 and VIF is less 10. 
Consequently, it can be determined that the independent variables can used in the regression model of current 
research are free the issue of multicollinearity (Gozali, 2013) 
 
4.5.2 Autocorrelation Testing 
To determine the autocorrelation, using the Wooldridge test, the results of table 4 indicates that there is no 
autocorrelation problem exists. 
 
Table 4: Wooldridge test 
   
4.5.3 Heteroscedasticity Testing 
To determine the heteroscedasticity test, use the Breusch-pagan test/Cook-Weisberg test. the results of the table 5 
indicate the no problem of heteroscedasticity. 
 
Table 5: Breusch-pagan test/Cook-Weisberg test 
 
Ch
2
(1) P-Value 
705.54 0.354 
                                                                                 
4.6 Regression Analysis 
Table 6 
 
Variables  Coff t-value P-value 
Tobins’ Q    
Board size (BS) 0.12 
 
2.97 
 
0.003 
 
Outside directors (OD) 1.15 1.55 0.121 
Leverage (LEV) 0.87 1.86 0.056 
BS*LEV .060 3.96 0.000 
OD*LEV -0.21 -3.99 0.000 
Firm size (FS) 0.028 0.48 0.631 
constant -.8631597 -2.45 0.015 
R2 0.067   
F-value 5.91   
 Prob > chi2 0.0000   
 
 
 
 
Variables VIF 1/VIF 
BS 1.12 0.89 
OD 1.12 0.89 
FS 1.10 0.91 
F(1,129) P-Value 
1.88 0.172 
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5. Findings and Discussion 
5.1 Board Size, Outside Directors, Leverage and Firm Performance  
the table 6 showing the results of regression analysis and indicating the board size (BS) has positive significant 
effect (β = 0.12, t = 2.97, P<0.01) on firm performance (Tobin's’ Q). The current study indicates that the board size 
plays a significant role in the management ability to oversee managers. This result is consistent with previous 
studies such as (Khan & Ali 2018; Sheikh, Wang and Khan 2013; Malik et al. 2014; Johl, 2015). Outside directors 
have insignificant effect (β=0.1.15, t value =1.55, p>0.1) on firm performance (Tobin's’ Q). Outside directors 
shows no relation with firm performance due to low representation of non-executive directors. This finding is in 
line prior studies such as (Johl et al. 2015, Sheikh, Wang and Khan 2013). The leverage also shows an interaction 
effect between board sizes, outside directs and firm performance. The findings are supporting the view of Hsu 
(2013) that leverage is very important to firms so as to ensure the financial resources required for new business 
actives and get the better performance of the firm. 
 
6. Conclusion and Implication 
The intention of current study is to offers empirical evidence of the interaction effect of leverage on the relationship 
between board size, outside directors and firm performance. The finding of the study suggests that interaction of 
leverage strengthen the influence of board size and outside directors on firm performance. 
 
The current study results have the potential to support institution such as Pakistan Stock Exchange and invertors to 
know how to leverage can influence performance of firms. Also, the results of this study provide the better 
understanding of agency theory as well as the influence of the agency theory. 
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